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Abstract 
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DON'T BLAME THE IDEALIZATIONS 
(REVISED VERSION) 
 
1 Introductory Remarks 
The ideal gas law and the Lotka-Volterra equation are paradigm examples of 
what I shall call idealized hypotheses. The ideal gas law is exactly true of gases 
composed of noninteracting point-masses in random motion that undergo only 
perfectly elastic collisions, and the Lotka-Volterra equation is exactly true of 
predator-prey populations in which, among other conditions, prey reproduce at 
a constant rate while predators consume prey and die at constant rates. I call the 
conditions <gas particles are noninteracting point-masses> and <predator 
mortality rates are constant> idealizing conditions or constituent idealizations 
(for their respective hypotheses), because they distort and simplify.  
 
Real-world phenomena often contravene idealized hypotheses, failing to behave 
in accordance with those hypotheses.1 Such hypotheses seem to misrepresent 
phenomena, and the source of apparent falsity in each case seems to be, at least 
in part, the constituent idealizations for each hypothesis. For example, gas 
behaviors at high pressures contravene the ideal gas law, and the ideal gas law 
apparently misrepresents high pressure gas behavior, at least in part, by virtue of 
idealizing the volume and attractive forces of gas particles.  
 
Some take this appearance for reality. Laymon, for example, claims that 
"idealizations (because they are false) introduce bias or distortion into our 
computations" (1985: 148; see also Laymon 1984: 116; Elgin 2007: 38, Slater 
2008: 534). This interpretation takes appearances at face value and involves two 
theses: first, that idealized hypotheses misrepresent any phenomenon that 
contravenes them; second, that at least some idealized hypotheses misrepresent 
phenomena that contravene them by virtue of the hypotheses' constituent 
idealizations.  
 
There is, however, a competing inclination to interpret idealizing conditions as 
restricting the domains of application for idealized hypotheses rather than 
injecting falsity into them (Wimsatt 1987: 28-9). There is disagreement about 
how such restriction happens. Advocates of the ceteris-paribus approach take 
idealized hypotheses to have (often implicit) ceteris-paribus clauses, based upon 
their constituent idealizations, which exempt them from representing 
phenomena that involve interfering factors (see McMullin 1985: 268-270; Lange 
2002). Cartwright, developing a capacity-oriented variant of this approach, 
argues that idealized hypotheses characterize the enduring tendencies or 
                                                          
1 Another way to express this claim, in language I develop below, is that the 
apparent content of idealized hypotheses often misrepresents real-world 
phenomena. 
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capacities of objects. Rohrlich and Hardin (1988), in contrast, maintain that 
hypotheses' constituent idealizations impose validity limits and that these limits 
restrict the domain of phenomena for which hypotheses are valid. There are 
other similar approaches (Giere 2006; Suppe 1989). 
 
While all of these charitable interpretations deny that idealized hypotheses 
misrepresent whatever phenomena contravene them, the interpretations are 
less clear about whether, when idealized hypotheses do misrepresent, they 
sometimes do so by virtue of their constituent idealizations. The second thesis of 
the face-value approach to interpreting idealized hypotheses is false only if some 
method for restricting the scope of idealized hypotheses is guaranteed to 
exempt those hypotheses from misrepresenting any phenomena for which their 
constituent idealizations would be to blame. But, so far as I know, no advocate 
for any charitable interpretation has provided an argument establishing this. 
Furthermore, there are worries that methods of charitably interpreting idealized 
hypotheses are too liberal, exempting such hypotheses from misrepresenting at 
all (see Smith 2002). If these worries are well-founded, charitable methods 
exempt idealizing conditions from blame for misrepresentation only at the cost 
of rendering idealized hypotheses trivially true; and if the worries are misplaced, 
the extant literature shows at most that some idealizing conditions, for some 
idealized hypotheses, are not to blame when those hypotheses misrepresent. 
This is a far cry from refuting the second thesis of the face-value approach and, 
moreover, depends entirely upon whether the particular method of charitable 
interpretation under consideration is correct.  
 
The plethora of competing methods for charitably interpreting idealized 
hypotheses makes doubtful the success of any argument, based upon only one 
such method, against the second thesis of the face-value approach. Nor will 
abstract appeals to principles of charity help, since even if those principles favor 
interpreting idealized hypotheses as not always misrepresenting whatever 
phenomena contravene them, they do not help to determine sources of blame 
for misrepresentations. There is, however, reason to believe that the second 
thesis of the face-value approach is mistaken regardless of which interpretive 
method is correct. Attention to the ways in which practicing scientists tend to 
restrict domains of application for idealized hypotheses, along with some 
reasonable auxiliary assumptions, shows that no idealized hypothesis 
misrepresents because of its constituent idealizations. Those idealizations help 
to determine the hypothesis' content, and they do so in a way that prevents 
hypotheses from being false by virtue of their constituent idealizations.  
 
The argument I shall give in defense of this thesis does not rule out the 
possibility that idealized hypotheses sometimes misrepresent. Nor does it appeal 
to any particular method of charitable interpretation. Instead, it extracts a 
distinction implicit in all (extant) charitable interpretations, between a 
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hypothesis' apparent content and its actual content, in order to argue that if 
scientists are principled when restricting the scope of idealized hypotheses, 
idealizing conditions are never to blame when idealized hypotheses 
misrepresent. The main virtue of this approach is that it avoids the need to 
defend as correct any particular charitable interpretation. The argument, if 
sound, thereby provides a principled constraint on extant methods of charitable 
interpretation, so that any method ascribing blame to idealizing conditions 
should be rejected. If unsound, the argument focuses inquiry on what must be 
true of scientific practice when those conditions are to blame. However, this 
approach provides no guidance for how to determine the restricted scopes of 
idealized hypotheses. Accordingly, while what follows constrains the details for 
such guidance, providing the details themselves remains a separate project. (But 
see Jones 2009 for an effort to provide details.) 
 
I begin my argument with some terminological preliminaries. I then motivate, in 
turn, an adequacy condition for blaming idealizing conditions and an adequacy 
condition for interpreting idealized hypotheses. These conditions entail, contrary 
to the face-value approach, that idealizing conditions are never to blame when 
idealized hypotheses misrepresent. 
 
2 Vehicles of Representation and Sources of Blame 
Contessa distinguishes three kinds of representational vehicles (2010: 217-219). 
The first kind are materials models, actual concrete objects such as a fabricated 
model of DNA or a scale model of the Golden Gate bridge. The second kind are 
mathematical models, linguistic statements, often formulated in mathematical 
language, such as the equation for logistic growth in population biology or the 
equation of motion for the simple pendulum. The third kind, being neither 
concrete nor mathematical, Contessa calls fictional models, including in this 
category ideal gases, the ideal pendulum, and other nonsentential abstract 
objects.  
 
The hypotheses with which I am concerned in this paper are mathematical 
models (or sentential equivalents of mathematical models) rather than material 
or fictional ones. So, for example, I take “the ideal gas law” to refer to the 
equation PV=nRT rather than any real or ideal gas. While this departs from the 
current fashion of focusing on nonlinguistic representational vehicles, it is not 
necessarily incompatible with that approach (Worrall 1984). Nor does it do 
violence to scientific practice, where scientists routinely use statements, or their 
mathematical equivalents, as vehicles of representation. Moreover, since 
statements are truth-apt, focusing on hypotheses that are mathematical models 
(or their sentential equivalents) allows me to treat the content of a hypothesis 
as, roughly, what the hypothesis says about the world or how it represents the 
world as being. To a first approximation, the content of a hypothesis is its truth 
conditions. 
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Scientific hypotheses, understood in this way, are linguistic vehicles of 
representation. Such hypotheses represent when they characterize something as 
being a certain way; they are true of that thing when this characterization is 
successful and false of it when a failure. Some hypotheses, such as Maxwell’s 
hypotheses about the ether, represent entities that do not exist. These fictional 
representations differ from fictive ones, such as Kepler’s laws of planetary 
motion or Newton’s law of universal gravitation, which inaccurately represent 
real entities (Suárez 2010a: 230-231). Both fictive representations and 
representations that accurately represent real entities "point to a certain part of 
the world and say 'if you want to know about that part of the world I am pointing 
to, for a certain sort of purpose, I promise to help you in that respect and not let 
you down'" (Winsberg 2010: 90).  
 
I shall argue that when idealized hypotheses are nonfictional, their constituent 
idealizations are never to blame when they break their representational 
promises. Whether idealizing conditions are to blame when fictional 
representations break whatever promises they make is a topic I leave for 
another occasion. This does not, I trust, render my thesis entirely irrelevant. 
Several of our best scientific hypotheses, such as Coulomb's law and the 
mathematical models which constitute the Standard Model of particle physics, at 
least seem to be both idealized and nonfictional; and it remains unclear whether 
scientific models are properly understood as fictional representations at all 
(Giere 2009). (I hereafter typically omit the qualifier 'nonfictional.')  
 
I have nothing more to say about the nature of (nonfictional) representation 
beyond insisting that statements can represent, that "represent" is not a success 
term, and that a hypothesis misrepresents something only if the hypothesis 
represents it. For example, since the hypothesis "Barack Obama is an American 
citizen" does not represent the hotness of the sun (or the fact that the sun is 
hot), it should follow that it does not misrepresent the sun's temperature. These 
are fairly standard presumptions in the literature on scientific representation. 
(See Suárez (2010b) for an overview.) 
 
As nonfictional representational vehicles, scientific hypotheses represent targets 
in the real world.2 Fictive nonfictional representational vehicles represent their 
                                                          
2 Those who discuss fictional, rather than mathematical, models (Contessa’s 
representational vehicles of the third kind, which are neither concrete nor 
linguistic) tend also to accept that some of these models are nonfictional in 
Suárez’s sense, representing targets in the real world. For example, Vaihinger, a 
precursor to some contemporary work on fictional models, takes all fictions to 
be characterized, in part, by their contradiction with reality (see Fine 1993: 5); 
but they can contradict reality only if they purport to represent it. Giere calls his 
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real-world targets inaccurately; nonfictive ones, accurately. I shall refer to these 
targets of representation for scientific hypotheses as phenomena. Following 
Frigg and Hartmann (2009), I use "phenomenon" as "an umbrella term covering 
all relatively stable and general features of the world that are interesting from a 
scientific point of view."  Nothing here depends upon whether phenomena are 
facts, things, properties, or events; whether they are, as Cartwright maintains, 
“enduring tendencies or capacities” (1989: 1); whether they are experimental or 
model organisms; and so on. Apart from their status as real existents, the nature 
of phenomena is irrelevant to the focus in what follows, namely, the vehicles of 
representation and, in particular, what can make them misrepresent.  
 
There is a sense in which phenomena are what make hypotheses misrepresent. 
This is the sense relevant to truth-maker theory, concerning, typically, a relation 
between a linguistic entity, such as a hypothesis, and something nonlinguistic 
that makes the negation of the linguistic entity true or the linguistic entity itself 
false. (For examples, see Armstrong 2004 and Tennant 2010.)  I shall focus, 
however, on a second sense in which something can make a hypothesis 
misrepresent. The discovery of Neptune supplies a paradigmatic illustration. 
Prior to Neptune's discovery, Newtonian gravitational theory predicted a 
particular orbit for Uranus. This prediction misrepresented Uranus' exact orbit, 
and there is a sense in which the wobbles in Uranus' orbit contravened the 
Newtonian prediction and thereby made that prediction misrepresent. Yet there 
is also a sense in which what made the prediction misrepresent was the auxiliary 
assumption that there are no planets beyond Uranus. This is a blame-oriented, 
rather than a truth-maker-oriented, sense in which something can make a 
hypothesis misrepresent. 
 
This blame-oriented sense concerns a relation between two linguistic entities. 
For a Quine-Duhem problem, the relation involves a prediction and some 
premise, such as a law-statement or an auxiliary assumption, in a good argument 
                                                                                                                                                              
“understanding of models representational because it takes models not primarily 
as providing a means for interpreting formal systems, but as tools for 
representing the world” (1999: 44). Suárez maintains, of “most idealized models 
in science,” that “however inaccurate these models are in different respects and 
to some degree, their targets are real existing objects” (2010a: 230). Similarly, 
Frigg observes that, “[w]hen presenting a model, scientists … present a 
hypothetical system as an object of study, and they claim that this system is a 
representation of the particular part or aspect of the world that we are 
interested in, the so-called [sic] the target system” (2010b: 252); and he claims 
that “scientists use model-systems to represent parts or aspects of the world 
they are interested in” (2010a: 97).  I take this similar conception of 
representational targets to indicate that the conclusions I reach in this paper are 
not merely an artifact of focusing on linguistic representational vehicles.  
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for that prediction; and a solution to the problem requires identifying the 
premise(s) to blame for the prediction's falsity. When one statement makes 
some other statement misrepresent a phenomenon in the blame-oriented 
sense, say (by stipulation) that the former statement is a source of falsity for the 
latter, that the latter is false by virtue of the former, or that the latter 
misrepresents because of the former. For example, although wobbles in Uranus' 
orbit were falsity-makers for the original Newtonian prediction about the 
planet's exact orbit, the source of falsity for that prediction was the auxiliary 
assumption that there are no planets beyond Uranus; the prediction was false by 
virtue of this auxiliary assumption, misrepresenting the exact orbit because of 
that assumption.  
 
I have no precise account for what it is for a statement to be a source of falsity 
for a hypothesis. Something being a source of falsity differs from something 
being a falsity-maker for a hypothesis (in the truth-maker-oriented sense) in the 
same way that psilocybin's being a reason for a person's hallucinating differs 
from a bad trip's being a reason for the hallucination. My thesis in this paper is 
that, while idealizing conditions might be appropriately cited when explaining 
how an interpretation of an idealized hypothesis' actual content has gone awry, 
they are never among the elements to be cited in explaining how theory-making 
has misfired—idealizing conditions are never sources of falsity for idealized 
hypotheses; they never, in the blame-oriented sense, make idealized hypotheses 
false of real-world phenomena. (I admit that intuition and example do not lift the 
explicatory burden of giving this thesis a more precise meaning; I hope to satisfy 
this burden in future work, trusting here that example and intuition suffice to 
allay substantive confusions.)  
 
3 Content in Scientific Practice: Competing Interpretations 
Whether a scientific hypothesis misrepresents a phenomenon (or represents it at 
all) depends upon what the content of that hypothesis happens to be. But a 
hypothesis' actual content need not be what it seems to be. Appearances can be 
deceiving, especially concerning language. The waitress who quips that a ham 
sandwich left the restaurant without paying, for example, is not saying that a 
sandwich literally exited the restaurant and did not pay its bill. There are 
pragmatic reasons for this kind of discrepancy between appearance and 
actuality. For instance, a briefer expression is often more efficient to 
communicate than one that makes explicit the various qualifications and 
limitations that constitute the claim's actual content, at least when there is a 
background presumption that whoever needs to act upon the claim knows how 
to decipher the content it conveys.  
 
Scientific language is no different than ordinary language in this regard. An 
examination of standard science textbooks and journal articles reveals that 
statements of scientific hypotheses tend to be unencumbered by qualifications 
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or restrictions. Consider, for example, the ideal gas law. Halliday, Resnick, and 
Walker's Fundamentals of Physics identifies the equation PV=nRT as the ideal gas 
law and notes that the law holds for any single gas or any mixture of different 
gases for which the gas density is low (2001: 456); but this proviso is presented 
as restricting only the range of gas phenomena the law represents correctly. 
Bettelheim et al.'s Introduction to General, Organic and Biochemistry explicitly 
states that the ideal gas law is valid for (and thereby presumably represents) 
"not only any pressure, volume, and temperature, but also … any quantity of 
gas" (2010: 148). (Incidentally, these ways of speaking suggest that scientists 
take the ideal gas law to represent, or quantify over, all gases, whether real or 
ideal. This suggests that they understand the law to be nonfictional in Suárez’s 
sense, and that they allow for the possibility that the law accurately represents 
the behaviors of real gases.) 
 
More advanced texts offer provisos that seem to restrict the range of gas 
phenomena the ideal gas law represents (whether correctly or incorrectly). For 
instance, Kotz, Treichel, and Townsend's Chemistry and Chemical Reactivity 
notes that the ideal gas law "describes the behavior of a so-called ideal gas" as 
well as "real gases at pressures around one atmosphere or less and 
temperatures around room temperature" (2009: 524). The tenor of the 
subsequent discussion suggests that the law only describes this restricted range 
of gas behavior. If the authors are not using "describes" as a success term--the 
context does not make it clear--it follows that the ideal gas law does not 
represent gas behavior at high pressures or low temperatures. (It does not 
follow, however, that the law represents only behaviors of ideal gases, because 
not all behaviors of real gases occur at high pressures or low temperatures.) 
 
The philosophical literature makes this more confusing. There, scientific 
hypotheses are variously taken to be material conditionals, counterfactuals, 
ceteris-paribus claims, and so on. Derden distinguishes between equations, such 
as PV=nRT, and laws, such as the ideal gas law, which he takes to be a material 
conditional with the ideal gas equation as its consequent and a series of 
idealizing conditions as its antecedent (2003: 243-244). Lange specifies the law 
of definite proportions as being a ceteris-paribus claim according to which any 
chemical compound consists of elements in proportions unvarying by mass 
unless the compound is like ruby or like polyoxyethylene or something like that; 
but standard presentations of the law do not include these exceptions (2002: 
408). Rohrlich takes hypotheses from physics to have tacit validity limits 
specifying their domain of validity, because "an equation in physics is strictly 
meaningless unless its validity domain is known" (2002: 320).  
 
 There is good reason for this disagreement about what the actual content of 
idealized hypotheses happens to be. Teaching a scientific hypothesis in 
abbreviated form seems to be pedagogically more effective than teaching its 
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qualifications and limitations at the same time as its actual content. When we 
learn, generalizations come first; only later do we grasp the exceptions and 
nuances (see Bransford et al. 1999; Donovan and Bransford 2005). It is useful, 
accordingly, to distinguish between a hypothesis' apparent content and its actual 
content.  
 
The apparent content of a hypothesis is, roughly, the unrestricted, unqualified, 
literal content of the hypothesis. The actual content of the hypothesis, in 
contrast, is the content the hypothesis would have were all of its implicit 
qualifications and exceptions made explicit. While some charitable approaches 
to interpreting the actual content of idealized hypotheses might seem to 
guarantee that a hypothesis' implicit qualifications and exceptions include all 
constituent idealizations for the hypothesis, the notion of actual content alone 
does not. For example, if idealized hypotheses should be interpreted at face 
value, they lack implicit qualifications and exceptions and thereby are often false 
by virtue of their actual content misrepresenting real-world phenomena. 
Charitable interpretations of idealized hypotheses tend to presume a distinction 
between apparent and actual content. For example, Derden expresses the 
distinction as one between equations and laws; interpretations that appeal to 
ceteris-paribus clauses or validity limits express it as one between hypotheses 
stated without these provisos and hypotheses stated with the provisos made 
explicit. So the distinction itself can be understood as generalizing a distinction 
wrought in different ways by different methods of charitable interpretation. 
 
Certain widespread attitudes of practicing scientists toward the confirmation 
status of idealized hypotheses suggest that this distinction is significant. 
Consider, for example, Coulomb's law. This is widely regarded as extremely well-
confirmed over a wide range of charge separation distances, ranging from 10-11 
meters to several kilometers (Gadre and Shirsat 2001: 3). Halliday et al.'s 
Fundamentals of Physics conveys the general attitude of the scientific 
community: 
 
Coulomb's law has survived every experimental test; no exceptions to it 
have ever been found. It holds even within the atom, correctly describing 
the force between the positively charged nucleus and each of the 
negatively charged electrons …. This simple law also correctly accounts 
for the forces that bind atoms together to form molecules, and for the 
forces that bind atoms and molecules together to form solids and liquids 
(2001: 509, emphasis added; see also Tu and Luo 2004: S136). 
 
However, some phenomena contravene the law. For instance, two 
electrostatically interacting and similarly charged conducting balls switch from 
repelling each other to attracting each other at short separation distances 
(Saranin 1999); and electrostatic interactions between atoms in proteins do not 
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become arbitrarily large as the atomic separation distance becomes small, but 
instead become dominated by strong repulsive forces (Jackman et al. 1994: 197). 
If the law's actual content does not differ from its apparent content, the law 
misrepresents these phenomena, so that the phenomena are exceptions to the 
law. Hence, if interpretations of the content of idealized hypotheses should 
accommodate attitudes of practicing scientists toward the confirmation status of 
those hypotheses, properly interpreting Coulomb's law requires distinguishing 
the law's actual content from its apparent content (see also Jones 2009: 125-
126). This is so regardless of the proper way for excavating the law's actual 
content. 
 
Considerations like this not only motivate a distinction between apparent and 
actual content for hypotheses but also suggest that idealized hypotheses should 
not always be interpreted at face value. It does not show that these hypotheses 
should never be interpreted in this way, much less that their constituent 
idealizations should never be blamed for their falsity. Nonetheless, these claims 
follow from three others.  
 
1. A hypothesis' actual content misrepresents a phenomenon only if 
it represents that phenomenon. 
 
2. If a hypothesis' actual content misrepresents a phenomenon, it 
does so by virtue of the hypothesis' constituent idealizations only 
if both (a) the hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents that 
phenomenon and (b) the hypothesis' apparent content is false by 
virtue of the hypothesis' constituent idealizations.  
 
3. A hypothesis' actual content represents a phenomenon only if it is 
not the case that both (a) the hypothesis' apparent content 
misrepresents that phenomenon and (b) the hypothesis' apparent 
content is false by virtue of the hypothesis' constituent 
idealizations. 
 
For suppose that the actual content of some hypothesis, act(H), misrepresents 
some phenomenon P. And suppose, for reductio, that act(H) does so by virtue of 
its constituent idealizations ci(H). Then, via (2), the hypothesis' apparent content, 
app(H), misrepresents P and app(H) does so by virtue of ci(H). Since, via (1), 
act(H) represents P, it follows from (3) that either app(H) does not misrepresent 
P or that app(H) is not false by virtue of ci(H), which contradicts the entailment 
from (2). Hence, whenever the actual content of a hypothesis misrepresents a 
phenomenon, this misrepresentation is not by virtue of the hypothesis' 
constituent idealizations. 
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(1) is a stipulation. (2) follows from some plausible relations between a 
hypothesis' apparent and actual content; (3), from some observations about 
scientific practice. I briefly defend (2) in the next section and offer a lengthier 
defense of (3) in the section following. After that, I consider the argument's 
merits and conclude with some remarks about what can make idealized 
hypotheses false if not their constituent idealizations. (Apart from the pragmatic 
reasons I mention above, I shall not discuss a closely related issue, namely, why 
scientists might bother to formulate idealized hypotheses if this actual content is 
never false by virtue of their constituent idealizations, especially given that 
presentations of those hypotheses have the potential to mislead and perhaps 
could, in principle, be replaced by something that is not misleading. There is an 
extensive literature on this further issue, and I take many suggestions in that 
literature, suitably reframed, to be compatible with this paper’s thesis. For 
example, Strevens argues that formulating hypotheses without explicitly 
articulating their exceptions enables a particular kind of methodological 
response to apparent negative instances that would not be possible were 
scientists to present fully articulated hypotheses. See also Batterman 2009; 
Pietroski and Rey 1995; Strevens 2008: 315-329; Weisberg 2007; Wilson 1991.) 
 
4 An Adequacy Condition for Blaming Idealizations 
While there are a plethora of approaches for how to interpret a hypothesis' 
actual content, none is widely accepted. If interpreted at face value, the actual 
content of a scientific hypothesis is exactly what appears in typical textbook or 
journal presentations of that hypothesis. This approach endorses a kind of 
literalism, taking scientists to be more like Alice (from Wonderland) than the 
March Hare, meaning by hypotheses exactly what they say about them. (I am not 
aware of anyone who explicitly endorses this approach; but it is a natural default 
position.)  Charitable interpretations for hypotheses' actual content, such as 
those appealing to validity limits or ceteris-paribus clauses, reject this literalism. 
They agree with face-value interpretations, however, that the only way for a 
hypothesis' actual content to misrepresent a phenomenon is for its apparent 
content to do so.  
 
It is not feasible to demonstrate this claim for every extant approach; there are 
too many. But consider three cases. If hypotheses are interpreted at face value, 
their actual and apparent content are identical, and there is obviously no way for 
the former to misrepresent something the latter does not. If hypotheses contain 
validity limits, their actual content is just their apparent content prefixed with a 
condition that certain validity limits are satisfied. So a hypothesis' actual content 
misrepresents only when those limits are satisfied and its apparent content 
misrepresents. Similarly, if hypotheses are interpreted as ceteris-paribus claims, 
their actual content is just their apparent content prefixed with a ceteris-paribus 
clause. So a hypothesis' actual content misrepresents only when its ceteris-
paribus clause is satisfied and its apparent content misrepresents.  
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Suppose, then, that a hypothesis' actual content misrepresents some 
phenomenon by virtue of the hypothesis' constituent idealizations. It follows, by 
an appeal to consensus among face-value and charitable interpretions, that the 
hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents the phenomenon too. Furthermore, 
the source of this falsity must be the hypothesis' constituent idealizations. For if 
the hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents the phenomenon for some 
reason unrelated to the hypothesis' constituent idealizations, this can only be in 
virtue of some mysterious pre-established harmony between those idealizing 
conditions making the actual content false and other reasons making the 
apparent content false. This is implausible. For example, it would be odd for the 
ideal gas law's actual content to misrepresent ammonium gas at low 
temperatures and medium pressures by virtue of idealizing intermolecular 
forces, and yet for the law's apparent content to misrepresent that gas by virtue 
of, say, incorrectly representing the relationship between pressure, volume, and 
temperature. These considerations entail a constraint for legitimately blaming 
idealizing conditions for the falsity of an idealized hypothesis' actual content, 
namely, that if a hypothesis' actual content misrepresents a phenomenon, it 
does so by virtue of the hypothesis' constituent idealizations only if the 
hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents that phenomenon and the 
hypothesis' apparent content is false by virtue of the hypothesis' constituent 
idealizations. 
 
5 An Adequacy Condition for Interpretation 
Although there is no consensus about the details of how properly to interpret 
idealized hypotheses, there is a constraint that any adequate interpretation must 
accommodate. There are certain ways in which practicing scientists tend to 
restrict the ranges of phenomena for which idealized hypotheses are 
representations. If these restrictions are not ad hoc, if scientists restrict 
hypotheses' scopes in a principled manner, then every reason for a hypothesis' 
apparent content being false by virtue of its constituent idealizations is also a 
reason for restricting the representational scope of the hypothesis' actual 
content. I shall argue that this entails, as an adequacy condition for interpreting 
scientific hypotheses, that a hypothesis' actual content represents a 
phenomenon only if either the hypothesis' apparent content does not 
misrepresent the phenomenon or the hypothesis' apparent content is not false 
by virtue of the hypothesis' constituent idealizations. 
 
Recall the discussion of Coulomb's law. The law's actual content must differ from 
its apparent content. But the actual content cannot be more expansive, with a 
wider domain of application; that kind of interpretation does not accommodate 
the widespread attitude of practicing scientists toward the law's confirmation 
status. So the law's actual content must have a narrower, restricted domain of 
application. Only this kind of interpretation accommodates scientists' attitudes. 
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Interpreting the law's content at face value thereby mistakes appearance for 
reality and raises the temptation to blame the law's constituent idealizations. 
This temptation should be resisted, because even if these idealizations appear 
blameworthy, even if the apparent content of Coulomb's law misrepresents 
electrostatic interactions between atoms in proteins by virtue of some idealizing 
conditions, the law's actual content does not misrepresent those interactions at 
all. 
 
This line of reasoning can be made more precise and generalized with the help of 
two technical notions. Let the scope restrictors be the class of all conditions such 
that, when a hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents some phenomenon by 
virtue of one of these conditions, its actual content does not represent that 
phenomenon. Competing interpretations of idealized hypotheses' content make 
different proposals about the nature of scope restrictors. They are ceteris-
paribus conditions according to the ceteris-paribus interpretation and validity 
limits according to the validity limit interpretation, while the class is empty 
according to the face-value interpretation. When a hypothesis' actual content is 
narrower than its apparent content, the scope restrictors determine how to 
restrict the hypothesis' apparent content in order to obtain its actual content. 
 
Let the scapegoat idealizations be the class of all conditions such that a 
hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents by virtue of one of these conditions 
and this condition is a constituent idealization for the hypothesis. Like all 
idealizing conditions, scapegoat idealizations distort and simplify (see Jones 
2005). They represent phenomena of interest as having features they do not 
have by representing some quantity as effectively absent or some proportion as 
effectively negligible. For example, the condition dg/dh=0 simplifies: when 
combined with an equation that represents some phenomenon as depending 
upon variations of gravity with height, the condition allows one to derive an 
equation that does not take into account gravitational variation; and when the 
former equation is unknown, the condition allows one to register the fact that 
one is not taking into account some feature of the phenomenon. Conditions that 
make the magnitude of some quantity approach an extreme limiting value, such 
as limit(R) in which the Earth's radius is made to be infinitely large, and 
conditions, such as limit((v/c)0) from relativity theory, in which some 
proportion between two quantities approaches or attains some extreme limiting 
value, perform similar functions. The conditions in these examples, moreover, 
are all scapegoat idealizations, idealizing conditions that are sources of falsity for 
the apparent content of idealized hypotheses. 
 
If scientists are principled when restricting the scope of scientific hypotheses, 
every scapegoat idealization is a scope restrictor. This follows from the ways in 
which a condition that distorts and simplifies can be a source of falsity for an 
idealized hypothesis' apparent content. There are two standard ways. First, the 
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condition might represent as absent some factor that is present. Such conditions 
might idealize friction or other forces as effectively absent, idealize systems as 
effectively closed to gamma rays or other outside influences, or idealize objects 
as effectively absent. When a factor makes a difference to a particular 
phenomenon, a hypothesis about the phenomenon based upon a condition 
idealizing that factor often will appear to be false. For example, the apparent 
content of Coulomb's law entails that electrostatic interactions between atoms 
in proteins become arbitrarily large as the atomic separation distance becomes 
small. The law thereby idealizes as effectively absent any factor that might 
interfere with those interactions. But strong repulsive forces become dominant 
at small separation distances, so that the electrostatic interactions do not 
become arbitrarily large: the law's apparent content misrepresents these 
interactions.  
 
A second way in which an idealizing condition can be a source of falsity for an 
idealized hypothesis' apparent content is by representing as negligible some 
(nonnegligible) proportionality relation between physical quantities. For 
instance, one idealizing condition for nonrelativistic Newtonian mechanics is that 
an object's velocity is negligibly small compared to the speed of light in a 
vacuum: (v/c)«1. The apparent content of nonrelativistic Newtonian mechanics 
misrepresents phenomena for which the ratio v/c is not negligible. When a 
proportionality relation is not negligible, hypotheses that idealize that relation 
often appear to be false. 
 
There is perhaps one further way in which an idealizing condition can be a source 
of falsity for an idealized hypothesis' apparent content. Hypotheses often have 
false apparent content when based upon conditions that idealize a board as 
perfectly flat, a collision as perfectly elastic, a ball as perfectly spherical, 
consumers as perfectly knowledgeable about prices, and so on. Each of these 
conditions distorts, in a simplifying way, the magnitude of some physical 
quantity. It is not clear whether this is a special case of falsity due to idealized 
interfering factors or proportionality relations or, instead, a sui generis source of 
falsity. For example, perhaps idealizing consumers as omniscient about prices 
amounts to assuming that their ignorance of prices is absent; but perhaps it does 
not. Regardless of how these conditions should be classified, there seem to be 
no other kinds of scapegoat idealization. 
 
Attention to scientific practice shows that each kind of scapegoat idealization 
has at least one paradigm instance that is also a scope restrictor. Coulomb's law 
is a convenient source of examples, because the scientific community widely 
regards that law as not falsified by the several phenomena that contravene it. In 
particular, the scientific community regards Coulomb's law as not falsified by 
electrostatic interactions between atoms in proteins at small separation 
distances or the attractive behavior of two electrostatically interacting, similarly-
15 
 
charged conducting balls at short separation distances. The actual content of 
Coulomb's law must not represent these phenomena, lest the law be falsified by 
them by virtue of misrepresenting them.  
 
The condition <no strong repulsive force is present> is a constituent idealization 
of Coulomb's law, and in particular it is a scapegoat idealization of the first kind 
(see Jackman et al. 1994). The first phenomenon fails to be part of the law's 
representational scope only if this condition is also a scope restrictor for the law. 
The condition <the ratio of the characteristic size of the interacting bodies to 
their separation distance is negligibly small> is also a constituent idealization for 
the law, and in particular it is a scapegoat idealization of the second kind (see 
Smythe 1968: 2). The second phenomenon fails to be part of the law's 
representational scope only if this condition is also a scope restrictor for 
Coulomb's law.  
 
If scapegoat idealizations of the third kind form a distinctive class, it is not clear 
that there are any such idealizing conditions for Coulomb's law. Fortunately, 
there is another appropriate source of examples for scapegoat idealizations of 
this kind. The scientific community widely regards the Standard Model of particle 
physics as not falsified by any available evidence (Gaillard et al. 1999). 
Nonetheless, the Standard Model seems to have consequences that are 
inconsistent with evidence about phenomena for which gravity matters. For 
instance, observations of gravitational lenses and the deflection of starlight 
during solar eclipses provide evidence that spacetime is curved near massive 
objects. But the Standard Model is a quantum field theory and, as such, contains 
the flatness of spacetime as an essential component (Hartmann, 1998). The 
condition <spacetime is flat> is a constituent idealization for the Standard Model 
and a scapegoat idealization of the third kind. Phenomena for which gravity 
matters do not fall within the Standard Model's representational scope only if 
this condition is also a scope restrictor for the Standard Model (see Jones 2009: 
127-128). 
 
If the scientific community restricts the representational scope of idealized 
hypotheses in a principled way, a scapegoat idealization of a particular kind 
should qualify as a scope restrictor in a paradigm case only if any scapegoat 
idealization of the same kind qualifies as a scope restrictor. Being principled 
requires treating relevantly like cases alike; and being a scapegoat idealization is 
relevant to whether an idealizing condition is a scope restrictor, because the 
paradigm cases of scapegoat idealizations are scope restrictors by virtue of being 
scapegoat idealizations. For example, since the condition <the ratio of the 
characteristic size of the interacting bodies to their separation distance is 
negligibly small> is a scapegoat idealization that treats a particular 
proportionality relation as negligibly small, and since, by virtue of being a 
scapegoat idealization, that condition is a scope restrictor for Coulomb's law 
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with respect to the attractive behavior of two electrostatically interacting, 
similarly-charged conducting balls at short separation distances, every scapegoat 
idealization that treats a particular proportionality relation as negligibly small 
should be a scope restrictor with respect to any phenomenon. Since, for each 
kind of scapegoat idealization, there is a paradigm case in which that condition is 
also a scope restrictor, it follows that every scapegoat idealization is a scope 
restrictor.  
 
Glashow confirms this generalization, claiming that "Newtonian mechanics is 
absolutely true—with a well-defined envelope defined by c and ħ" (1999: 77). 
The constant c, for example, figures in one of the validity limits for Newtonian 
mechanics, according to which the ratio between a body's speed and the speed 
of light in a vacuum is negligibly small. This is a scapegoat idealization: the 
apparent content of Newtonian mechanics misrepresents phenomena for which 
this ratio is not negligibly small. Assuming that Glashow's attitude is correct, the 
validity limit is also a scope restrictor for Newtonian mechanics. (This does not 
mean that every condition for a hypothesis is a scope restrictor, because not all 
conditions for a hypothesis are idealizing conditions and hypotheses can be false 
by virtue of these nonidealizing conditions. I substantiate this claim in the 
concluding section.) 
 
This examination of scientific practice yields the result that, for each kind of 
scapegoat idealization, there is a paradigm instance of that idealization that is 
also a scope restrictor. Presuming that scientists restrict the representational 
scope of idealized hypotheses in a principled way, it follows that every scapegoat 
idealization is a scope restrictor. The definitions of "scope restrictor" and 
"scapegoat idealization" thereby entail the third supporting premise for the 
thesis that no idealized hypothesis misrepresents because of its constituent 
idealizations.  
 
For suppose some hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents some 
phenomenon P and that it does so by virtue of the hypothesis' constituent 
idealizations. Then, by the definition of "scapegoat idealization," the hypothesis' 
apparent content misrepresents P by virtue of some scapegoat idealization. 
Since every scapegoat idealization is a scope restrictor, it follows that the 
hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents P by virtue of some scope restrictor. 
Hence, by the definition of "scope restrictor," the hypothesis' actual content 
does not represent P. It follows, by conditional proof and contraposition, that a 
hypothesis' actual content represents a phenomenon only if it is not the case 
that both the hypothesis' apparent content misrepresents that phenomenon and 
the hypothesis' apparent content is false by virtue of the hypothesis' constituent 
idealizations.  
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6 Content in Scientific Practice Revisited 
The thesis that idealizing conditions are never to blame when idealized 
hypotheses misrepresent provides a principled justification for not interpreting 
idealized hypotheses at face value. Its supporting argument relies upon several 
contentions about scientific practice, and it is worth making explicit some costs 
of rejecting them. The support for the first premise is linguistic; those who reject 
it risk changing the topic rather than engaging with the argument. The 
substantial premises, the ones that merit strict scrutiny, are the second and 
third.  
 
The second premise is, I suspect, the least worrisome. My argument for it relies 
upon two contentions: 
 
A. If a hypothesis' actual content misrepresents a phenomenon, its 
apparent content does too. 
 
B. If a hypothesis' actual content is false of some phenomenon by 
virtue of the hypothesis' constituent idealizations, its apparent 
content is too. 
 
I lack conclusive arguments for either contention. They are obviously true if 
there is no difference between a hypothesis' actual and apparent content; so 
advocates of face-value interpretations should find neither problematic. 
Moreover, attention to scientific practice shows that there is a difference, and 
marking it conservatively favors both (A) and (B). Finally, the cost of denying 
either is high. Rejecting (A) requires not only rejecting some of the most widely 
endorsed approaches for interpreting the actual content of scientific hypotheses 
but also attributing a kind of esotericism to practicing scientists. For if (A) is false, 
Coulomb's law (say) might misrepresent some electric phenomenon even though 
a person aware of all such phenomena, but exposed only to common statements 
of the law, would be unable to discover the law's falsity. This is quite implausible, 
given the likely pedagogical rationale for the distinction between actual and 
apparent content: making explicit a hypothesis' qualifications and limitations 
should not reveal new reasons for which the hypothesis can be false. Similarly, 
rejecting (B) requires supposing that even when a hypothesis' actual content 
misrepresents a phenomenon because of its constituent idealizations, the 
hypothesis' apparent content might give no indication that these idealizations 
are to blame.  
 
The argument for the third premise invokes the notions of scope restrictor and 
scapegoat idealization as well as a substantial contention: 
 
C. Every scapegoat idealization is a scope restrictor.  
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I suspect that (C) is of most concern to those who interpret idealized hypotheses 
at face value. I offer, in its defense, an analogical argument: 
 
C1. For each kind of scapegoat idealization, there is a paradigm 
instance of that kind that is also a scope restrictor. 
 
C2. For each kind of scapegoat idealization, if there is a paradigm 
instance of that kind that is also a scope restrictor, then every 
instance of that kind is a scope restrictor. 
 
Examples support (C1), and (C2) follows from the principle that relevantly similar 
cases should be treated similarly.  
 
Rejecting (C1) requires either rejecting my analysis of the supporting examples 
or identifying idealizing conditions that are not scope restrictors and yet make 
hypotheses false without representing as absent some factor that is present, 
representing as negligible some nonnegligible proportionality relation between 
physical quantities, or misrepresenting the magnitude of some physical quantity 
in a simplifying way. This first option, however, fails to accommodate the general 
attitude of practicing scientists toward Coulomb's law and the Standard Model. 
Regarding the second option, even if there are such conditions, my examples 
establish a version of (C1) that quantifies over some prominent kinds of 
scapegoat idealization. The restricted contention supports the result that none 
of the prominent kinds of idealizing conditions are to blame when an idealized 
hypothesis' actual content misrepresents. This also provides a reason not to 
interpret idealized hypotheses at face value, albeit in less dramatic fashion.  
 
Rejecting (C2) requires either denying that scientists restrict hypotheses' scopes 
in a principled way, denying that being a scapegoat idealization is relevant to 
being a scope restrictor, or identifying relevant dissimilarities between some 
scapegoat idealizations and others such that the dissimilarities provide good 
reason for maintaining that not all scapegoat idealizations are scope restrictors. 
The first option, however, sacrifices charitable interpretation for an ad hoc 
preservation of appearances. Scientific practice seems to tell against the second 
option. In the paradigm cases for each kind of scapegoat idealization, scientists 
seem to treat such idealizations as scope restrictors in order to prevent 
particular hypotheses from being false of certain phenomena. For example, in 
the case of Coulomb’s law, scientists seem to treat the condition <no strong 
repulsive force is present> as a scope restrictor in order to prevent the law from 
being false of electrostatic interactions between atoms in proteins at small 
separation distances. The scientists would have no reason to treat the idealizing 
condition in this way if that condition were not a scapegoat idealization: if the 
law’s apparent content did not misrepresent such interactions by virtue of the 
idealizing condition, scientists would not restrict the actual content of the law’s 
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representational scope in order to exclude those interactions from the law’s 
scope. Accordingly, in this case, the condition <no strong repulsive force is 
present> is a scope restrictor by virtue of being a scapegoat idealization. Because 
attention to scientific practice reveals that other paradigm cases of scapegoat 
idealizations also are scope restrictors by virtue of being scapegoat idealization, 
scientific practice supports the claim that being a scapegoat idealization is 
relevant to whether an idealizing condition is a scope restrictor.  
 
Regarding the third option for rejecting (C2), consider an objection that might 
seem promising but, on closer inspection, loses much of its luster. Suppose there 
is a principled distinction between fundamental hypotheses and 
phenomenological ones. The examples I give of scapegoat idealizations that are 
also scope restrictors involve Coulomb's law and the Standard Model, and there 
is probably a good case to be made that these are fundamental. Proponents of 
interpreting idealized hypotheses at face value, in contrast, give examples like 
the ideal gas law and the Lotka-Volterra equation, and there is probably a good 
case to be made that these hypotheses are phenomenological. So one might 
argue that (C2) is false because, even if no fundamental hypothesis 
misrepresents because of its constituent idealizations, some phenomenological 
hypotheses do: some scapegoat idealizations for phenomenological hypotheses 
are scope restrictors. 
 
There are several problems with the particulars of this objection, even granting 
the presumed distinction between fundamental hypotheses and 
phenomenological ones. First, it is not clear that the distinction can bear the 
weight the objection requires. Cartwright (1983), for example, argues that the 
fundamental hypotheses, rather than the phenomenological ones, typically 
misrepresent. Regardless of whether that argument succeeds, the objection 
relies upon the intuition that some phenomenological hypotheses misrepresent 
because of their constituent idealizations. Although many philosophers seem to 
have this intuition, it is not clear that it accurately captures the attitudes of 
practicing scientists, if only because the working scientists with whom I have 
spoken report that they consider the ideal gas law to have a limited range of 
application and deny that the law is falsified by available evidence (see Jones 
2009: 131).  
 
Furthermore, it is not clear that some scapegoat idealizations for 
phenomenological laws are not scope restrictors. For example, a scapegoat 
idealization for both Coulomb's law and the ideal gas law is the condition <no 
interfering factors are present>. If this is a scope restrictor for one hypothesis, it 
seems that it should be a scope restrictor for the other too. More generally, the 
constituent idealizations for fundamental hypotheses are often idealizing 
conditions for phenomenological ones, and there is not anything obviously 
special about scapegoat idealizations for phenomenological hypotheses that 
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might prevent them from being constituent idealizations of fundamental ones. 
Maintaining that there is a privileged class of scapegoat idealizations for 
phenomenological hypotheses that are not scope restrictors looks suspiciously 
ad hoc, especially when scientists themselves do not clearly follow suit.  
 
I suspect that there will be similar problems for other attempts to show that not 
all scapegoat idealizations are scope restrictors. Scientific practice itself does not 
suggest any obvious distinctions of the relevant kind, and the attitudes of 
practicing scientists do not clearly support any intuitions that would put such a 
distinction to work in the right way. Moreover, the scapegoat idealizations that 
are scope restrictors for some hypotheses are prevalent, appearing as 
constituent idealizations for many scientific hypotheses. While the examples I 
use to support (C) conveniently involve hypotheses widely regarded as 
exceptionless, they do not seem to be especially distinctive in any other way. 
Still, one might worry that, despite these dim prospects for discovering a 
relevant difference between kinds of scapegoat idealization, (C) must be false, 
lest it follow that idealized hypotheses never misrepresent at all. I address this 
worry in the final section. 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
Just as whether water makes a wheel rust depends upon the material content of 
the wheel, whether idealizing conditions make a hypothesis false depends upon 
the actual content of the hypothesis. If the preceding considerations are correct, 
then when the actual content of an idealized hypothesis misrepresents some 
phenomenon, its constituent idealizations are never a source of that falsity.  
 
This result is trivial, of course, if it implies that the actual content of an idealized 
hypothesis cannot misrepresent any phenomenon. Fortunately, it is possible to 
show that the result does not have this implication. For it is possible to construct 
a scenario and an idealized hypothesis about the facts of that scenario, such that 
none of the hypothesis' constituent idealizations are sources of falsity and yet 
the hypothesis' actual content misrepresents a certain phenomenon.  
 
Consider a nonrelativistic Newtonian world containing a simple pendulum 
subject only to forces due to gravity G and damping D from the surrounding 
environment. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that this world is our world. (I 
take this to be a legitimate supposition, because the point of this example is to 
demonstrate the absence of an entailment relation. More realistic examples are 
possible; but presenting those examples would require much lengthier 
explications.) Suppose also that, among other conditions, the pendulum's mass 
M is constant and its rod is rigid by virtue of the distance R between its pivot and 
center of mass being constant. Since the world is nonrelativistic, the ratio of the 
pendulum's velocity V to the speed of light C is negligibly small, so that its 
momentum P=MV. Hence, since the world is also Newtonian, the pendulum's 
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net force F=dP/dt=M(dV/dt). The net torque equals the sum of the torques due 
to each of the forces acting on the pendulum. Supposing, contrary to the facts of 
this fictional world, that there is no damping on the pendulum, it follows that the 
pendulum's net torque  = RMG(sinθ), where θ is the angle of the pendulum's 
displacement from its equilibrium position. These conditions yield an equation of 
motion for the pendulum:  
 
 E1. dV/dt = (G/R)(sinθ).  
 
Ex hypothesi, equation (E1) is an idealized hypothesis: its constituent idealization 
is that there is no damping force on the pendulum. By construction of the 
example, this idealizing condition is the entire reason for why the pendulum's 
exact behavior contravenes this equation. 
 
Let a literal interpretation of equation (E1) be the hypothesis' apparent content. 
This content misrepresents the pendulum's exact behavior. The no-damping 
idealization, however, sets a validity limit for the equation, given by the 
pendulum's quality factor Q, a dimensionless parameter representing the 
pendulum period's resistance to disturbance. Pendulums subject to small 
amounts of damping are higher quality, because their oscillations die more 
slowly; while pendulums subject to high amounts of damping (such as 
pendulums immersed in oil) are lower quality (see King 2009: 43-45). The validity 
limit for equation (E1) is (1/Q)«1. (Q-10 as the damping 0.)  Since the 
apparent content of (E1) is false of the pendulum's exact behavior, the condition 
<1/Q is negligibly small> is a scapegoat idealization for that behavior. The 
idealization is thereby also a scope restrictor for that behavior, guaranteeing that 
the actual content of equation (1) does not represent the pendulum's exact 
behavior. Accordingly, the no-damping condition restricts, rather than distorts, 
the equation's actual content, preventing that content from misrepresenting the 
pendulum's exact behavior. This seems to confirm the worry that idealized 
hypotheses cannot misrepresent if, among other things, every scapegoat 
idealization is a scope restrictor. 
 
Consider, however, an equation of motion for the above pendulum that is 
idealized and yet does not have an apparent content that is false entirely by 
virtue of the equation's constituent idealizations. Suppose that, in addition to 
(falsely) assuming that there is no damping force on the pendulum, scientists in 
the fictional world hypothesize that an object's momentum is a product of its 
mass M, velocity V, and temperature T, so that an object's amount of motion 
depends not only upon how much stuff is in the object and how fast that stuff is 
moving but also upon how hot that stuff is. These scientists, accordingly, deduce 
that the pendulum's momentum P=cMVT, where c is a proportionality constant 
to ensure consistency of dimensions and is set equal to 1 by an appropriate 
choice of dimensional units. Supposing also that scientists correctly take the 
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pendulum's temperature to be constant, their faulty hypothesis about 
momentum-temperature dependence entails that the pendulum's net force 
F=dP/dt=MT(dV/dt). This yields the following equation of motion for the 
pendulum: 
 
 E2. dV/dt =  (G/RT)(sinθ).  
 
Ex hypothesi, equation (E2) is an idealized hypothesis: its constituent idealization 
is, as with (E1), that there is no damping force on the pendulum. Like equation 
(E1), equation (E2)'s apparent content misrepresents the pendulum's exact 
behavior and the equation's constituent idealization is a source of this falsity. 
Since the apparent content of (E2) is false of the pendulum's exact behavior, the 
condition <1/Q is negligibly small> is a scapegoat idealization for that behavior. 
The idealization is thereby also a scope restrictor for that behavior, guaranteeing 
that the actual content of equation (E2) does not represent the pendulum's 
exact behavior. Nonetheless, the equation's actual content misrepresents 
something about the pendulum.  
 
The apparent content of equation (E2) entails that the pendulum's period 
depends, in part, upon its temperature: heating or cooling the pendulum should 
alter its period if the equation is correct. Since this is false, the apparent content 
of equation (E2) misrepresents the factors that affect the pendulum's period. But 
the (lone) constituent idealization for the equation is not a source of this falsity. 
Temperature is not an interfering factor for this dependence phenomenon, 
because the assumption that pendulum motion depends upon temperature is 
not a simplifying assumption. Nor is there a scapegoat idealization for this 
dependence that might prevent the actual content of (E2) from misrepresenting 
that dependence. Accordingly, the actual content of equation (E2) misrepresents 
the factors that affect the pendulum's period. Even though the equation is 
idealized, its actual content is false by virtue of something other than the 
equation's constituent idealizations.  
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